The ability of Indian Armed Forces to act impartially during internal unrest is reducing
The relationship between the armed forces and their political masters is a matter of great importance to the state. Too lax a control may result in a coup, while too restrictive a control may lead to corroding the effectiveness of the forces. As for parameters of effectiveness, these are not restricted to only protection of territorial integrity. The services are expected to deliver much more.
in his classic The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil–military relations, Samuel Huntington observed that civilian control over the military “exists when there is this proper subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy”. He is pointing out that the best results accrue when the armed forces are autonomous but are subordinated to the state. Being autonomous makes it possible for them to play their required role in cases of civil unrest. (underlined by the author, for effect).
On this critical issue, there have been changes in India in the last few years which warrant revisiting the research.
An autonomous military alone can play a balancing role during domestic political crises involving civil unrest with the government. When militaries’ autonomy is curtailed by political leaders before the crisis, militaries cannot maintain the political balance between rulers and opponents, thereby increasing the risk of armed conflict,
This topic has been researched in depth and is available at Military autonomy and Balancing of the political crises, published in ‘Armed Forces & Society’,. The article states that ‘a political crisis represents a significant challenge to a state’s political system. We are concerned with major political crises that are liable to push a state toward internal armed conflict. During such crises, the role of the military becomes critical, not only due to the deterioration of domestic security (and, possibly, the loss of control over the state’s borders) but also because incumbent political leaders may try to use the military to quell growing popular dissent, thereby increasing the likelihood of escalation and violence. We suggest that, under such circumstances, a military that is capable of acting autonomously can maintain the political balance between the regime and its opponents, pushing all sides to attain an equilibrium. By contrast, a military that is incapable of acting autonomously of the regime can contribute to an escalation of the crisis and, possibly, the outbreak of internal armed conflict.’
As an example, the article documents how in 2010–2011 the Egyptian Military, was able to set its agenda independently of President Hosni Mubarak, and managed to play a balancing role in the crisis.
in 2011, during the mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square, the Egyptian Military consciously distanced itself from President Hosni Mubarak and the those loyal to him. Moreover, the military positioned its tanks and mechanized infantry between demonstrators and security personnel loyal to the president, signalling that the military was not an instrument of the ruler, depriving him of any ability to suppress the opposition using the armed forces. The officer corps was not ready to commit a massacre in order to keep Mubarak in power. Simultaneously, by refraining from forcefully removing the President, the military made it clear to the opposition that it did not identify with its demands, necessitating the search for a political solution.
The same article presents another example too — that of Syria — in which the military failed to play its role correctly.
The Syrian conflict began in March 2011, when demonstrators in Daraa protested at the security agencies’ arrest and torture of several local youths accused of spraying graffiti against the regime. These protests were mainly due to the deteriorating socioeconomic situation in Syria and unfulfilled hopes for reform. Yet, the president and his associates perceived even these limited protests as a challenge, leading them to a violent response. The regime deployed the Syrian Air Force, reinforcing the image of the military as a tool of the regime. Thus, the SAF became a “sectarian militia” in the service of the ruler and the dominant Alawite community.
It is now time to turn local and put things in Indian perspective.
The Indian society firmly believes two things about its armed forces. One, that their main task is to ensure territorial integrity, and two, that they being completely under civil control is a good thing. Both premises are correct but not entirely.
While protecting the territorial integrity of India is indeed the duty of the armed forces, it is so only by implication. Actually, The oath or affirmation taken by a combatant of Indian armed forces requires him or her to bear true faith and allegiance to the constitution of India. That task, by implication, calls for defending the territorial integrity. However, continuance of the constitution is surely means more than just the integrity of the external borders. It includes everything that may jeopardise the playing out of the Indian constitution, including internal disorder. It is interesting to note that officer cadets of the National Defence Academy (NDA), the primary source of the officer corps of the three services, recite a prayer daily, publicly and collectively, in which they seek help of God for strength ‘to guard our country against external aggression and internal disorders.’.
That makes it clear that the armed forces are also expected to deal with internal disorder.
Internal disorder includes a state of unrest of the people with the existing government. At times, the people may seem opposed to the government. This does not necessarily mean that they are also opposed to the constitution. It could well be that it is the government that is contradicting the constitution. It is to cater for this rare eventuality that the armed forces are expected to be ‘defenders of the constitution’ and not defenders of the government. While the armed forces must take orders from the cabinet, their Supreme Commander remains to be the President of India, someone above and outside the cabinet.
It becomes clear that the Indian systems expects its armed forces to have autonomy, while working under civilian control. However, some factors, as seen widely in the last few years, seem to militate against this autonomy. But before that, let us see how armies maintain or lose their autonomy, so vital if they are ever called upon to play their desired role in cases of large-scale civil disorder.
The research article shows that ‘In divided societies, the military is more likely to maintain its autonomy when all major communities are represented in its commanding bodies and when its composition reflects broader social divisions (structural factor), when its identity mirrors that of the various communities (cultural factor), and when its actions seek to preserve intercommunal consensus (rational factor). In such circumstances, the political leaders will find it difficult to deploy the military against their opponents during a major political crisis. However, in the absence of these factors, some civilians are liable to identify the military with one specific community, and the ruler’s deployment of the military may thus cause the situation to deteriorate into internal armed conflict. These conclusions are relevant for other divided societies including most Middle Eastern states.’
At the level of soldiers, Indian armed forces have an excellent record of representation of its major communities. It also has excellent harmony between all communities serving in it. However, what matters more is the representation of all communities in its ‘commanding bodies’, that is, its body of senior officers.
Our record of representation of our second largest community, Muslims, in the officer cadre, is very poor. In the book ’The Wellington Experience, A study of values and attitudes within the Indian Army’, Col David O Smith of the US army records the opinions of several US officers who got to observe the Indian officer corps from close quarters. The book records that despite the Muslims being about 13 % of the Indian population, they constituted only 0.7 percent of the army officer population in prestigious 1 year course of the Indian army at Wellington, Tamilnadu.. One US officer had noted that ‘the few Muslim officers knew they would never be promoted beyond the rank of colonel because their loyalty to the state was suspect, and that “except for the Sikhs, you generally had to be a Hindu to get ahead in the Indian Army.’. This is not good, particularly when the most likely scenario of civil unrest in India includes the one involving marginalisation of Muslims.
The other issue that worries many citizens is the increasing propensity of senior officers of the armed forces to identify closely with the government of the day, on non-military issues.
India’s first Chief of Defence Staff, Late Gen Bipin Rawat made some remarks in 2019, as Army Chief which were an indirect criticism of the then ongoing protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act. These had set off a political storm and focused attention on what members of the defence forces can say, when it comes to politics, and what they can’t.
What exactly prohibits army personnel from making politically coloured statements? It is Army Rule 21 which states that no person who is subject to the Army Act, shall publish in any form or communicate to the press any matter in relation to a political question or on a service subject without the prior sanction of the Central Government. However, since the government did not, it seems, act against this, the stage was set for other senior officers to follow, which they have been doing vigorously in large measure.
Since then, our senior officers have been regularly committing the army in non-military tasks like playing bands for covid warriors, making railway bridges in Mumbai, providing air shows ahead of the PMs visit. They have also been proactively taking up statements echoing a lot of political sentiments, which reportedly help the enemy.
Contrast this with how officers of the Australian Defence Forces distanced themselves from even their own Defence minister, while he was answering a political question.
In 2020, the Australian Defense Minister Christopher Pyne, flanked by his senior officers, was answering questions from reporters. Then he was asked a question that cantered on politics. As Minister Pyne began to answer, Gen. Angus Campbell, Australia’s chief of defense, strolled over and tapped him on the shoulder. “My apologies,” Campbell said. “I might ask that the military officers step aside when you’re answering these questions.” With that the assembled officers walked off.
Can that ever happen in India? Can an armed force seen as aligned with the present government, carry out its role of protection of the constitution and prevent unnecessary bloodshed, during an internal crisis?
Identification of the senior leadership of Indian armed forces with the government, coupled with such low representation of the Muslims in the officer corps will curtail their autonomy. This will reduce their effectiveness in carrying out the role of being a ‘protector of the constitution’ if called upon to do so. With this, they lose the leverage to act in national interest, in times on internal disorder.
This matter concerns citizens more than the government and the armed forces. If the armed forces get handicapped in discharging their duties fully, the citizens stand to lose the most. And therefore, the onus is on them to act now.
